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The 2008-09 Global Financial Fallout: Shanghai and Dubai as Emerging 
Financial Powerhouses?
1
 
 
Gordon C. K. Cheung, Durham University 
Abstract 
The global financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 tested the United States financial 
leadership as well as sent a beam of hope to many emerging countries in finding ways 
to shoulder the global financial leadership. The major idea behind this paper is to 
demonstrate and critically assess the possibility of emerging economies re-shaping the 
future financial system. Shanghai and Dubai will be used to understand the meaning 
of a government-supported international financial center project. This paper will first 
assess the challenge of the current financial turmoil in relation to financial 
globalization. Second, Shanghai and Dubai will be used to illustrate their effort—both 
before and after the financial crisis—in the establishment of an international financial 
centre with a view of the challenge toward the current financial system. Finally, I will 
endeavor to draw some parallels/differences of the responses or measures taken by the 
countries that were affected by the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 to examine the 
possibility and shortcomings of government-backed financial policy in connection 
with the global financial architecture. 
 
Key words: Dubai International Financial Center, Financial intermediaries, Global 
Financial Centers Index, Regulation, Shanghai International Financial Center 
Introduction 
Global market confidence shattered as a result of a chain of huge financial collapses. 
Two of the U.S. housing mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (sharing 50 
percent of the U.S. housing mortgage market share) had been nationalized by the U.S. 
government in early September 2008. Then, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest 
investment bank in the U.S., was forced to go bankrupt in the middle of September 
2008. Immediately after that, the largest insurance company, American International 
Group (AIG) was bailed out by the Federal Reserve with U.S.$85 billion. According 
to the Editorial comment from the Wall Street Journal, after Morgan Stanley and 
 2 
Goldman Sachs returned to commercial banking, it spelt the end of the Wall Street: 
―And so, in a single week, the era of the independent investment bank has ended. 
Wall Street as we‘ve known it has ceased to exist.‖ (The Wall Street Journal 2008: 
15). According to the estimation of the National Institute of Economic and Social 
Research (NIESR), the total cost of the sub-prime housing crisis will be in the range 
of U.S.$400 to U.S.$600 billion (NIER 2008: 9). The global growth was expected to 
reduced from 5.0 percent in 2006 to 4.2 percent in 2008 (ibid.: 10). In the final quarter 
of 2008, the global trade in goods and services actually declined by 6.7 percent! The 
NIESR yet expected that by the end of 2010, global growth should return to 2.1 
percent. (NIER 2009: 10-11) 
 
In respond to the global financial crisis, it appeared that all the leading economies 
tried to come up with some solution to rescue the global market. All the Group of 
Seven (G7) financial ministers agreed on October 10, 2008 in Washington that the 
confidence of the financial market in the world should be restored immediately and 
one of the broadly agreed measures was to take the ownership of banks by injecting 
money directly from the government. According to Willem Buiter, Professor of 
European Political Economy, London School of Economics, guarantee, especially 
government guarantee of banking liabilities is essentially (Buiter 2008) Such a 
dramatic agreement resulted from the tumbling of almost all financial centers of the 
world did not seem to be able to boost market confidence because the original 
U.S.$700 billion bail-out plan was not especially effective. Dow Jones dropped by 20 
percent within a week from October 6-10, 2008 and the Tokyo Nikkei Index dropped 
24 percent concomitantly.  
 
Another major global cooperation was made through the London Summit on April 2, 
2009 (or G20 Summit).
2
 The Summit agreed to throw another U.S.$1,100 billion to 
boost the global economy, to help ailing economies through further help from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), to provide more supervision of multinational 
institutions and strengthen regulations, to increase trade, to eradicate tax haven and to 
reform the IMF. (Grice and Morris 2009: 2-3) During the Summit, Barack Obama, the 
President of the United States, declared, ―After weeks of preparation, we have agreed 
on a series of unprecedented steps to restore growth and prevent a crisis like this from 
happen again.‖ (Financial Times, April 3, 2009, p. 4). The Summit set a standard of 
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agreement and also generated some solidarity among leading economies. They also 
agreed to rejoin in Pittsburgh in September 24-25, 2009 for another G20 Summit. 
Nevertheless, some economic sectors of individual countries were still suffered as a 
result of the crisis. One other noticeable examples was that the largest carmaker in the 
U.S., General Motors, filed for Chapter 11 protection and was officially bankrupt on 
June 1, 2009,  resulting in a total losses of U.S.$81 billion. (Clark 2009) 
 
The current financial crisis has demonstrated the problem of the existing international 
financial architecture. According to Roger C. Altman, ―The financial and economic 
crash of 2008, the worst in over 75 years, is a major geopolitical setback for the 
United States and Europe.‖ (2009: 2) Yet, it also signals to a number of emerging 
economies that there is window of opportunity for them to help create a new order of 
global financial architecture. Among the others, the ―international financial outreach‖ 
of Shanghai and Dubai presents some opportunities and challenges. For one thing, 
they are determined to greatly enhance their international financial power. As a result 
of this, at the moment of global bail out, the world may need to take into 
consideration how to engage, if not accommodate, two emerging economies which 
have long been reliant on the development of state driven financial centers. This paper 
will first illustrate the interaction between financial liberalization and globalization, 
and followed by using the Global Financial Centres Index 3 (GFCI3) report in 2008 
to assess the international financial standard between Shanghai and Dubai against 
other financial centers. In addition, I shall discuss the current development of 
Shanghai and Dubai with a view to looking at the respective government‘s policies of 
creating their own model of international financial centre before and after the 
financial crisis. We will evaluate the responses of the leading economies under the 
current financial crisis with a view to compare the responses that were carried out a 
decade ago among other Asian economies.  
Financial Globalization and the Emerging Financial Centers  
Globalization emerged in the period between the latter half of the 19th century and the 
initial years of the 20th century (1850—1914) (O‘Rourke and Williamson 1999: 5). 
The notion of globalization is not new but the outcomes of globalization, such as 
standardization, marketization and norms adherence, nevertheless, penetrate and 
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precipitate into every country, requiring mutual inter-dependence and assimilation to 
take place. Karl Polanyi‘s (1944) ground-breaking book The Great Transformation 
set forth a classical literature in studying the power of transformation, the pattern of 
change and the facilitation of market economy in the 19th century. The ―self-
regulating‖ nature of market behavior actually energized the world toward an 
astonished new page (ibid.: 3). In addition, as argued by Edward J. Nell: 
 
Not that market outcomes are optimal, [italic in original] but rather that they 
have a certain objectivity and reflect robust good sense. If you pay attention to 
the market signals, you ought to do all right; if you don‘t you will run a serious 
risk of going under. (1996: 51) 
 
The momentum of market and the dynamic force of liberalism energize the world to 
grow in an unprecedented manner. Empirical studies and research recently attribute 
the transformation of the global economy to the market impetus and the force behind 
it (Chandler 1990). 
 
As far as international finance is concerned, the U.S. was first confronted with a 
setback in the 1970s when Nixon announced the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
System in 1971 (Gilpin 1987: 134). However, the inability to maintain the Bretton 
Woods System in the early 1970s (U.S. dollars pegged with gold) gave rise to the 
foundation of our current volatile financial infrastructure. (Komiya et al. 1988: 318). 
Although the U.S. financial leadership has been challenged after the 2007-09 financial 
crisis, the relative decline of the U.S., especially in global finance, is more 
complicated. As Beeson and Broome put it clearly, “As a result, the negative 
externalities that are potentially generated by U.S. hegemonic influence are likely to 
come more sharply into focus, especially if scholars examine the complex nature of 
American power in the contemporary era without pigeon-holing such debates into 
ideological clichés or limited discussions about relative U.S. hegemonic decline.” 
(2009: 5) 
 
Different from military might, in the reign of international finance, no state can 
single-handedly create a financial hegemony. Benjamin Cohen wrote a decade ago 
warning that: ―Currency spaces now are shaped not by political sovereignty but by the 
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invisible hand of competition–governments interacting together with societal actors in 
the social spaces created by money‘s transactional networks‖ (Cohen 1998: 5). After 
almost a decade, in Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global 
Assemblages, Saskia Sassen further contended the tension between globalization and 
nation-state by reminding us that ―For today‘s globalizing dynamics to have the 
transformative capacities they evince entails far deeper imbrications with the 
national – whether governments, firms, legal systems, or citizens – than prevailing 
analyses allow us to recognize‖ (2007: 1). Financial globalization was made more 
salient through the latest technology and the facilitation of various intermediaries, 
mutual funds and hedge funds, apart from the subsidiary of various banking sectors. 
According to John Eatwell, ―Liberalization has been accompanied by extraordinarily 
rapid technical progress – in data processing and financial modelling – that has 
transformed financial markets‖ (2008: 83). In time, such dynamism of the 
globalization of finance eventually brought about two divergent views on the 
governance of global finance. 
 
Academicians such as Robert Shiller (2000) used Irrational Exuberance to describe 
the rocketing of stock prices in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. He attributed the 
causes to the financial chaos from the confluence of a cluster of reasons such as the 
availability of internet, irresponsible financial analysts, the increase of pension fund 
and the mutual fund, coupled with the baby boom in the United States. Yet, George 
Soros, the founder of the Quantum Fund, disagreed with the academics by challenging 
the foundation of the economic theory.
3
 He argued that:  
 
In my view there is no such thing as equilibrium in financial markets because 
market participants are trying to discount a future which is itself shaped by 
market expectations. … they are shooting at a moving target rather than 
counting a future equilibrium. 
(Soros 1997: 2) 
 
His assumptions are that economic agents are not perfect and knowledge is costly. 
Therefore changes are inevitable. He further contended: 
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I cannot change them [rules that govern financial market] unilaterally. If I 
impose the rules on myself but not on others, it would effect my own 
performance in the market but it would have no effect on what happens in the 
markets because no single participant is supposed to be able to influence the 
outcome. 
(Soros 1998: xxv) 
 
He simply called the financial market a ‗reflexive‘ event. His latest comment on the 
current financial crisis is that:  
 
―The international financial system also needs repairing but there are grounds 
for optimism. Europe has realized that it needs to complement the euro with a 
government safety net for interbank credit. And the International Monetary 
Fund is finding a new mission in protecting countries at the periphery from the 
storm at the centre.‖ (Soros 2008)  
 
If we go back to his motto, changing is everything and no one can dominate in the 
financial market. We are now actually watching a game of redistribution of financial 
power between the state and the market witnessing the current financial market. Of 
course, Soros has been criticized by many that his so-called theory was not new but 
some sort of personal reflections and most of them are within the scope of neo-
liberalist doctrine. We will turn to the analysis of two emerging financial centers: 
Shanghai and Dubai. 
Importance of Shanghai and Dubai as International Financial Centers 
In March 2008, Y/Zen Group, commissioned by the City of London, came up with the 
Global Financial Centres Index 3 (GFCI3) report.
4
 The report used five key areas for 
the construction of the index. They are: people, business environment, market access, 
infrastructure and general competitiveness. As a result, London ranked number 1 
(rating of 795) and New York ranked number 2 (rating of 786). Both therefore are 
considered as not just international financial centers but global financial centers 
(GFCI3 2008: 16). The rest of the financial centers were categorized to fulfill various 
roles for international, niche, national and regional purposes. Hong Kong, ranked 
number 3, had a rating of only 695, far away from even New York. In other words, in 
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the reign of financial and global monetary competition, no one can rival these two 
financial hegemonies. Yet, if we move down from the ladder, the competition among 
the rest of financial centers is as severe as that between London and New York.  
 
Most important of all, according to the report, three financial centers will become 
―significantly more important over the next two to three years‖. They are Dubai 
(ranked 24 and rating of 585), Shanghai (ranked 31 and rating of 554) and Singapore 
(ranking of 4 and rating of 675) (ibid.: 6). If we do not take Singapore into 
consideration (which should link with Hong Kong more closely), it is intriguing to 
study Dubai and Shanghai because their rating had increased by 10 and 27 points 
respectively from the last GFCI2 in 2007. As far as the report is concerned, ―A 
movement of between 10 and 30 points signifies that the competitiveness of a 
financial centre needs to be watched‖ (ibid.: 13). Dubai‘s financial status, according 
to the report, is less sensitive to change. The GFCI3 indicated that it has been 
evolving toward a mature and stable market in the coming two to three years. On the 
contrary, Shanghai, although changed rapidly in terms of rating (increasing by 27 
points), it might be more volatile and susceptible to global changes. Yet, the report 
agreed that these two financial centers are very dynamic in terms of stability. 
 
Development of Shanghai as International Financial Center 
 
Shanghai’s Financial Status before the 2008-09 Financial Crisis 
Before the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Shanghai 
had already been a banking and financial center. Under the semi-colonial status, 
Shanghai in the 1930s was considered as very liberal and a land of opportunity in 
China. Yet, after 1949, the PRC banned any activities that were considered as 
capitalist. Among the other cities, Shanghai was hit hard because of its capitalist and 
financial status. After China re-opened its doors in 1978, the idea of locating 
Shanghai as financial center was first initiated by the paramount leader Deng 
Xiaoping when he visited Shanghai on January 28, 1991. The following year, he also 
paid visit to Shenzhen (the Southern tour) to re-confirm China‘s initiative in opening 
its market and sustaining economic reform. He mentioned that  
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Finance is very important. It is the centre of modern economy. If finance can be 
handled well, it will activate the whole economy. In the past [in the 1930s] 
Shanghai was a financial centre, a place for free exchange of currency, and it 
has to be the same in the future. If China has to achieve international financial 
status, we need Shanghai. Although it is something in the future, we should 
begin now. 
(Deng 1993: 366)  
 
The 14
th
 National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party formally named 
Shanghai an ‗international economic, financial and trade centre‘ in 1992. Pudong was 
designated to be a new economic zone and Lu Jia Zui the Central Business District 
(CBD). Yet, even before 1992, shares were traded in Shanghai in 1984, and the 
People‘s Bank of China established an ‗over-the-counter‘ market in Shanghai and the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was officially opened on December 19, 1990 
(Gamble: 2003: 167–168) 
 
Ever since the mid-1990s, both the central and municipal governments have been 
working together to attract domestic and foreign companies to invest in Shanghai. In 
order to make it a success, Shanghai‘s financial center, considering as a strategic 
initiative, was directly placed under the central government‘s control. The Financial 
Work Party Committee (FWPC) was established in March 2000 under Shanghai 
Municipal Party Committee and the Financial Services Offices (FSO) was under 
Shanghai Municipal Government. Both bodies are directly under the State Council in 
charge by Chinese Vice Premier (Heilmann 2005: 651).  Even Hong Kong, which has 
always been an international financial center, was hugely mocked by Zhu Rongji‘s, 
Chinese Premier, comment that (Freudian slip or subconscious feeling!) Shanghai was 
like New York and Hong Kong was like Toronto. In other words, Shanghai was 
bestowed such extraordinary power both from the central government as well as from 
the party. Recently, Wen Jiabao, China Premier, pointed out that financial 
development is the key to Chinese economic competitiveness (Nie et al. 2008: 115). 
 
In 2005, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences completed a report ―Assessment of 
the Financial Ecological Environment on Chinese Cities‖ which assessed 50 big cities 
in China by using different financial variables. Shanghai ranked as the top financial 
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city.
5
 Local companies began to set up new headquarters in Shanghai as a result of the 
government‘s incentive. According to Sebastian Heilmann, in time, ―Shanghai‘s 
emergence as the main center of financial business in China was seen as a threat to the 
growth of local financial industries in other parts of China‖ (Heilmann 2005: 649). 
Shanghai‘s GDP recorded U.S.$128.8 billion in 2006, and per capita GDP was 
U.S.$7,000 in the same year. (China Daily, February 10, 2007) In 2007 the value of 
the stock market in Shanghai was U.S.$326,272 million (GFCI3 2008: 43). Until 
December 2006, there were 94 foreign banks having branches in Shanghai, with 
approximately U.S.$60 billion capital values (Hugang jinji 2008: 33). Domestically, 
until February 2007, 25 out of the 55 Chinese mutual funds established offices in 
Shanghai, and four out of nine insurance companies operated offices in Shanghai 
(ibid.: 35). On March 14, 2006, during the Fourth Plenary Session of China‘s Tenth 
National People‘s Congress, ‗Shanghai International Financial Centre 2010 Blueprint 
(2010 guihua)‘ was formally included in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) 
(Fan 2006: 708). 
 
As far as Shanghai‘s future development is concerned, according to Liu Gang of 
Guangdong Business School, there are three stages of development. Immediately, 
Shanghai should keep its financial status in China by increasing the percentage of 
financial contribution in the GDP. Such measures can be worked out initially with the 
local financial intermediaries. In the medium term, regulation and financial 
infrastructure should meet international standards. Government should provide more 
professional training and to gradually open up the renminbi or yuan (Chinese currency) 
market. In the long run, Shanghai should be considered as a regional financial center, 
competing with Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo. By that time, the financial market 
should be completely opened and government‘s (especially local government) 
intervention should be kept to minimum (Liu 2007: 153). Yet, internationalization, 
limited financial products, regulations and limited financial professionals are the 
major elements that Shanghai has to improve to narrow the gap from other 
international financial centers (Duan 2005: 18). With the construction of the Shanghai 
World Financial Center (new tenants began to move in from June 2008), Shanghai‘s 
international financial center‘s status is going to climb to new heights, especially in 
the provision of state-of-the-art infrastructure and financial hardware.   
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Challenge of Shanghai as International Financial Centre after the 2008-09 
Financial Crisis 
 
To many surprise, the first move of China after the financial meltdown in Wall Street 
in late 2008 was not to respond to the international financial environment but to 
stabilize internal financial stability. One of the major measures was to announce a 14-
point of support to Hong Kong‘s economy, including the crucial point of letting 
companies to conduct cross border trading of Chinese currency (yuan). (South China 
Morning Post, December 20, 2008, Business B1). According to Donald Tsang, Hong 
Kong‘s Chief Executive, ‗The motherland, China, will always be the strongest 
support.‘ (Chan: 1). Of course, the launching of 14-point of support to Hong Kong 
was also a compensation to Hong Kong as a result of the losing of visitors/travelers 
from Taiwan because of the re-linkage between China and Taiwan.  
  
Secondly, China quickly slipped into the chaos and tried to first discredit the U.S. 
dollars in the London Summit. China pledged potential help to the international 
financial market by offering U.S.$95 billion yuan to the International Monetary Fund. 
Yet, China also wanted to use Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) to partly supersede the 
receding of the power of the U.S. dollars in the international finance. (Evans-Pritchard
 
2009) Yet, finally, more importantly, the biggest financial initiative after the financial 
crisis was Shanghai‘s financial status. On April 14, 2009, Chinese State Department 
released Document 19 which was to officially developed Shanghai as an international 
financial center and international transshipment center. In general, according to the 
architecture of the State Department, Shanghai should be developed as an 
international financial center trading in Chinese currency and to accomplish Chinese 
economic growth by 2020.
6
  
 
What about the challenges to other cities in China? In a recent visit to Shanghai 
between May 10 to 16, 2009, I attended the Shanghai Forum 2009. Beijing was not 
particularly happy about Shanghai as the international financial center, according to a 
senior colleague at Fudan University. He explained that Chinese banking industry 
played a key role in Chinese financial development and the big four state-owned 
banks (Agricultural Bank of China, Bank of China, China Construction Bank and 
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Industrial and Commercial Bank of China) have the headquarters in Beijing. 
Traditionally, banking was considered to be the linchpin of finance and the central 
government has overarching control from the policy incentive in Beijing. The new 
status of Shanghai as an international financial center empowered Shanghai‘s ability 
to diversify its financial products to stocks, futures, derivatives and other new 
products, which reinforced Shanghai‘s regional power, reducing further the ways of 
control from the central government.
7
  
 
More importantly, the central government‘s ―special attention‖ to be paid to Shanghai 
inevitably develops a sense of ‗moral hazard‘ resulting in further possible corruption 
cases and maladministration. Not to mention corruption, government‘s ―special care‖ 
may generate inefficiency and lower Shanghai‘s competitiveness. As Annalee 
Saxenian has demonstrated in the comparative study of the high tech centers in the 
East coast (the route 128) and the Silicon Valley in the U.S., the special attention from 
the government (more government contracts and projects were given to route 128) 
may actually retard the ability to innovate and to face the market competition 
(Saxenian 1996). According to Liu Mingkang, Chairman of China Banking 
Regulatory Commission (CBRC), ―Shanghai‘s financial sector only has about 
100,000 professionals, compared with some 400,000 on Wall Street and more than 
250,000 in London.‖ (Xinhua 2008) Obviously, such numbers of financial 
professionals will not be able to boost Shanghai‘s financial status to rival as 
established international financial center. 
 
In addition, it affects the role of Hong Kong which has always been relying almost 
entirely on housing and financial activities to support its economic structure. Before 
the financial crisis, said Frank Gong, chief economist for China at J P Morgan Chase 
in Hong Kong, ―it (Shanghai) can‘t compete with even its regional rival, Hong Kong, 
as long as rulers in Beijing refuse to make the currency fully convertible and restrict 
foreign investment in China‘s U.S.$400 billion domestic stock market.‖ (Mellor 2005) 
After the crisis and the granting of the official status of Shanghai, the general 
response from Hong Kong was that the central government was biased toward 
Shanghai and more and more future policy initiatives will be shifted to Shanghai as a 
result. (Hong Kong Economic Journal, May 18, 2009, p. 2). Nevertheless, given the 
economic rise of China, international investment in Shanghai will be manifested by 
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the future potential of Chinese market. It appears that one of the lessons from the 
current crisis is that Shanghai is being transformed to not just to serve the fund-raising 
requirement for the Chinese government, but also given real incentives and to 
gradually compete with the rest of the global financial centers.    
 
Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) 
DIFC before the 2008-09 Financial Crisis 
On December 1, 1971, Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al Qairain, Ras al 
Khaimah and Fujairah, those former sheikhdoms, came together to formulate a new 
political entity called the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Pacione 2005: 256). Although 
Abu Dhabi was considered as the administrative center, Dubai is in effect the 
economic center of the UAE. The ruling body, a Supreme Council, is composed of the 
leader from each of the seven emirates, with the head of state represented by Abu 
Dhabi and the prime minister from the ruler of Dubai, as a general rule (Bhatti et al. 
2006: 1)  The idea that Dubai has, for decades, been considered to be the ‗city of 
merchants‘ stemmed from its strategic location near the mouth of the Gulf as well as 
its geographical position as the hub for boats coming back and forth from Persia, 
India, China and East Africa (Al-Sayegh 1998: 87–88). At the turn of the twentieth 
century, Dubai occupied one of the world‘s largest pearl shipping industries (ibid.: 89). 
In other words, the natural port facilities, the pearl industry and the commercial know-
how perpetuated Dubai‘s merchant status in the Gulf for decades.  
 
Oil in Dubai, however, was found only in the early 1960s, and, from the very 
beginning, the government had realized that it was not sustainable in relying on oil 
alone, of which production actually peaked at about 420,000 barrels per day in 1991 
(Pacione 2005: 257 and Davidson 2008: 101). To keep the economy growing and to 
perpetuate Dubai‘s economic development, its leader began to initiate various 
economic development projects in order to diversify its economy. One of the major 
economic projects was to develop Dubai‘s infrastructure in order to enhance its future 
competitiveness: 
In the mid-1980s, … Dubai‘s crown prince, Sheikh Maktum bin Rashid Al-
Maktum, together with his two eldest brothers, Sheikh Hamdan bin Rashid Al-
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Maktum and Sheikh Muhammad bin Rashid Al-Maktum, met to discuss the 
emirate‘s future direction. At a time when other governments in the Gulf were 
reacting to the war by increasing their overseas investments in the West, the Al-
Maktum family decided the best solution was to buck the trend by making a 
commitment to invest in their own domestic infrastructure so that Dubai would 
be able to support and enhance its existing re-export oriented commercial sector 
while also facilitating broader diversification away from oil in the future. 
(Davidson 2008: 106) 
 
Airports, hotels, apartments and huge housing projects dominated the headlines of the 
newspapers in the late 1990s and early 2000s and physically dominated Dubai‘s 
skyline. Burj al Arab hotel, Palm Jumeirah and the World (and more recently the 
Universe) projects are not just infrastructures; they are textbook cases which 
frequently occupied the Discovery Channel! According to a researcher at the Gulf 
Research Centre, the government of Dubai is very successful in marketizing the 
image of Dubai or repackaging Dubai as the city of future.
8
  My understanding is that 
it is easier said than done. But, Dubai seems to be able to make use of its huge 
resources base to make a case to be successful. More recently, the Strategic 
Development Plan 1996–2010 is to allow Dubai to enjoy the status of ‗developed 
economy‘ as soon as possible (Pacione 2005: 257). It appears that Dubai‘s success is 
contradictory to the general development pattern of the Middle East as a whole, which, 
according Robert Looney, has systematically lagged behind the world economic 
growth. ―For the last thirty years‖ he contended, ―most of the region has essentially 
‗de-globalized‘ at a time when its population was doubling‖ (Looney 2005: 175). As 
one of the key economic development projects, Dubai International Financial Centre 
(DIFC), (contrasting from Shanghai incremental development) deserves much 
attention because of its scale, structural differences, government incentive and 
regional importance. 
   
DIFC was established in September 2004 to challenge some world established 
financial centers (London and New York) to provide securities, equities, fixed income 
and Shariah-compliant (Islamic) securities. One of the characteristics is that it has its 
own legal and regulatory system which has been built upon Common Law system 
(Chance 2008: 51). According to the IMF assessment report of the DIFC in May 2007, 
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DIFC was a ―geographic and legal jurisdiction within the emirate of Dubai‖ (IMF 
2007: 4). The constitution of the UAE was amended in 2004 to allow a ‗financial free 
zone‘ to be established. The Federal Law No. 8 clearly pointed out that the financial 
services and banking facilities of the zone cannot be carried out in local currency. In 
addition, Federal Decree No. 35 also pledged 110 acre of land for DIFC (ibid.). Other 
than criminal law, all the activities of DIFC will be governed under the UK common 
law system, including insolvency law, trust law, personal property law, and 
employment law. Regulation and monitoring of DIFC is under Dubai Financial 
Services Authority (DFSA), which is also responsible for the registration of 
professional services provided within DIFC, such as accountants and lawyers, etc. 
(ibid.: 5). In addition, within the DIFC, the Dubai International Financial Centre 
Authority (DIFCA) is responsible for economic planning and development as well as 
company registration, administration, company law and data protection (ibid.). 
 
DIFC focuses on six primary services: banking, capital markets, asset management, 
Islamic finance, reinsurance and back office operation (Bhatti et al. 2006: 5). Such 
broad range of services is buttressed with the openness and the transparency of DIFC. 
Among all the international financial centers listed in the GFCI3, one of the key 
issues is the time zone advantage. This is why London, New York and Hong Kong are 
so important because they spanning eight hours from one another, meaning that they 
trade for 24 hours a day. Dubai enjoys the same advantage, spanning equal amount of 
hours between Asia and Europe. After the Dubai International Financial Exchange 
(DIFX) was officially operational in September 2005, global big financial firms 
flocked in. Lloyds TSB established in December 2005, Deutsche Bank opened its 
branch in March 2006 and Morgan Stanley began operation almost at the same time. 
Trading volumes increased tremendously from U.S.$7.9 billion in 2000 to 
U.S.$100.69 billion in 2006 (Saidi 2008: 23). To diversify financial products, DIFX 
will begin to list equities derivatives from November 2008 to enhance liquidity and to 
attract more investors (Gulf News (Business) October 23, 2008, p. 1). DIFX also 
considers a ―‗fast track‘ process for U.S. companies to have a secondary listing in 
Dubai‖ (ibid). With the help of the latest technology such as Securities Settlement 
System (SSS) and the rapid growth of the stock exchange, Dubai has enormously 
secured its role to provide a safe and stable financial status market in the Gulf region 
(ibid.: 25). Other than financial services, various business schools began establishing 
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new offices in DIFC to achieve first move advantage. For instance, Cass Business 
School of City University London opened a new office in late 2008 in DIFC to offer 
Executive MBA programme. 
 
Nevertheless, Dubai‘s financial status has been increasingly challenged by the 
members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). For example, Qatar allowed 
foreign players to conduct local business. Saudi Arabia‘s geographical location and its 
market size give rise to its future potential to challenge Dubai (Bhatti et al. 2006: 19). 
As a whole, the GCC may need to further develop and diversify its financial sector 
because they have pegged their currencies with U.S. dollars and the government is 
just having too much revenue. Both factors are not necessarily beneficial to develop 
foreign exchange rate based financial products or even government bond market. Yet, 
the financial sector of the GCC should be able to support beyond GCC countries. 
Although Dubai is already enjoying significant advantages (such as brand name, life 
style, political stability, financial infrastructure, regulation and level of globalization), 
it should not procrastinate. Obviously, the revenue and government asset in Dubai, 
however, serve as counterweight to off-set some factors which may lead to better 
confidence building. Other than financial product development, the key question of a 
financial center perhaps is the ability to withstand the global financial challenges. 
 
Dubai enjoyed lots of advantages. Other than those mentioned before, Dubai‘s 
corporate tax is very low (14.4 percent), which can rival many competitors (GFCI3 
2008: 40). In Dubai, given the depletion of oil, financial services (increasingly 
important) are still in competition with other government investment, tourist industry, 
mega property projects, etc. Dubai is having a diversified development strategy, 
which means government attention may be less concentrated, resulting in a possible 
less resolute support when facing the financial crisis. In addition, argued by Mishkin, 
Good institutions, however, need to be home grown; … The development of 
good institutions in the advanced countries took hundreds of years as they grew 
and adapted to local conditions. Poor countries must ultimately develop their 
own institutions, and the citizens of these nations must feel they have ownership 
of those institutions or else the institutions will be ineffective and short-lived. 
(2006:13) 
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DIFC is like one country having two systems. Natural alienation therefore derives 
between the DIFC and the rest of the society, which is not especially healthy. How 
well DIFC can integrate Dubai‘s social and economic environment? With the 
opportunities from the oil, financial centers and real estates, moreover, ―many 
nationals themselves have become rentiers in their own right, as the diversifying 
economy has provided them with opportunities to become landlords‖ (Davidson 2008: 
178). That will translate into an ethos of procrastination and inefficiency. In the long-
run, Dubai may lose its competitiveness. 
 
DIFC after the 2008-09 Financial Crisis 
According to the analysis of the IMF, the plunge of the oil prices as a result of the 
financial crisis, hit hard the economies of the Middle East. The fact is that, according 
to the World Economic Outlook, April 2009, ―Among the oil-producing countries, the 
sharpest slowdown is expected in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), … A major 
financial center, UAE will also suffer from the contraction in global finance and 
merger and acquisition activity.‖ (IMF 2009: 91)  
 
Not only the Middle East in general and the UAE in particular did not live up to the 
expectation of many developed countries to come to rescue the global financial 
turmoil, but also did they turn to more in-ward looking strategies. Before the first G20 
Summit in November 2008 in Washington, Gordon Brown, the Prime Minister of the 
UK, paid visit to the Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE) to persuade the 
oil-rich countries to contribute to the IMF in the G20 Summit in Washington. Yet, 
King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia did not pledge any contribution during the Summit, 
but blamed the unregulated global financial institution. As a result, he announced a 
five-year development project of UD$400 billion to establish Saudi‘s infrastructure. 
(Momani 2009: 17) Similarly, other Gulf States (including UAE) followed suit and 
announced their own domestic stimulation plan. In fact, even from the social level, the 
general public of the Gulf did not support the injection of money to the IMF. Between 
November 18 to 24, 2008, a survey was conducted across the Gulf and the Middle 
East on the opinion of the injection of money to the IMF, among the 1,119 
respondents, 65 percent disagreed, 18 percent agreed and 17 percent did not know. 
(ibid, 19) 
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Although the Gulf Central Bank (GCB) has long been perceived among the member 
states, the financial crisis inevitably compounded the move toward a much closer 
monetary union. The Ministry of Economy and Finance from the GCC met on 
September 17-18, 2008 and recommended the proposal for the Gulf Monetary Union 
(GMU), which was approved in Muscat in December 2008. (Saidi and Scacciavillani 
2009: 25) Some key institutional frameworks of the GMU are as follows: 
1. Inflation rates should not exceed by more than 2 percent the weighted 
average of inflation rates in the GCC. 
2. Average short-term interest rates should not exceed by more than 2 percent 
the average of the lowest three rates. 
3. Foreign exchange reserves should cover goods imports for at least four 
months. 
4. Annual fiscal deficit should not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic product. 
5. The public debt ratio should not exceed 60 percent of GDP for the public 
government and 70 percent of GDP for the central government. 
6. The GCC currencies should maintain a fixed peg to the U.S. dollar. 
(ibid: 27-28) 
 
The deadline for a common currency in the GCC should be in January 2010, yet, 
incentive among the member states in the Gulf is not particularly strong. According to 
the assessment of the Gulf Research Council, everything is a big change. The switch 
over from national currency to common currency, the implementation of the monetary 
union and the legal aspects all require time and adjustment of the member countries. 
(The GRC Economic Research Bulletin 2008: 27) As we have discussed, the Gulf 
state did not feel strongly to help the international financial system after the financial 
crisis. Yet, a sense of regionalism has been geared up because of the global financial 
crisis.   
 
Shanghai and Dubai as Emerging Financial Powerhouses? 
 
Developing countries and emerging economies face a dilemma in terms of financial 
liberalization and the opening of the domestic financial market. According to Louis 
Pauly,  
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They discovered too that such movements could be triggered not only by any 
objectively reasonable loss of confidence by those investors in the integrity of 
domestic financial institutions or in the value of the national currency; they 
could be triggered by confidence-sapping shocks originating far away. 
(2008: 267) 
 
To make profit and to do well in the financial industry, emerging countries should be 
able to establish a financial institution that can support the international financial 
system (Mishkin 2006: 12). Shanghai and Dubai therefore can set an example to the 
global financial market that emerging financial centers can become responsible stake-
holders to shoulder global financial system. Shanghai has developed the state-of-the-
art infrastructure and government incentives (as international financial center in China 
in 2020). Dubai has been able to use the Common Law system in the DIFC to 
facilitating any economic transaction. Those are good signs to bring international 
financial system back into the soul of the emerging financial center.  
 
One key challenge behind Shanghai and Dubai is that they are all back up by the 
government. The central question investor will ask is that will the government 
intervene the financial center at will? What would be the benefit of having certain 
level of government back up? We may want to take the clock back to the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 and to locate any lessons. 
 
More and more literatures nowadays suggest that a certain degree of government 
intervention was essential to restore confidence of the societies that were bombarded 
heavily by the Asian financial crisis. According to Stefanie Walter‘s study, only Hong 
Kong was successful in defending its exchange rate stability whilst keeping away the 
money speculators between July 1997 and August 1998. Hong Kong relied heavily on 
its financial and banking sector which contributed almost 85 percent of its GDP (2008: 
428). In facing the financial crisis, Hong Kong Monetary Authority faced a dilemma, 
either to follow the purely market force by de-linking the pegging exchange rate 
between Hong Kong dollars and U.S. dollars or to heavily intervene in the stock 
market and to use a visible hand to safeguard the exchange rate. In balancing the cost 
and benefit, the Hong Kong government determined to go for intervention because 
―Policymakers were aware of the private sectors preferences… During that year the 
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authorities made it clear that exchange rate stability was their top policy priority‖ 
(Walter 2008: 429). 
 
The experience of far reaching consequences of the Asian financial crisis and 
successfulness of Hong Kong are useful in creating a platform for our discussion of 
the development of the international financial centers in Shanghai and Dubai. The 
central argument is that only when financial services have reached to a critical mass -
are international financial centers strategically important to governments and the 
‗national interest‘ and thus necessary to safe-guard in an emergency. Of course, the 
collapse of the Northern Rock in the United Kingdom and its eventual taken over by 
the government proved something wrong about the myth of ‗too big to fail‘. The 
current global financial crisis suggests that state rescue plans and direct ‗buy-in‘ from 
the banking sectors are dramatic measures which are needed at such a critical juncture, 
justifying some degree of the presence of the government in the financial system. 
These seem to be emerging issues in relation to derive a useful platform between 
government support and market incentive in the future global financial development. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In a nutshell, both Shanghai and Dubai are considered to have advantages in some 
tangible factors, such as tax incentive, infrastructure and volume of trading. Their 
creation of international financial centers needs further testing to see whether they can 
perform well in the sea of financial market. The 2008-2009 financial crisis in the U.S. 
was perceived very differently between Shanghai and Dubai. Shanghai has become 
more proactive in creating its status as international financial center. Dubai has 
become more conservative and looks more in-ward, with a view to further develop its 
regional strength by expanding the GCC Monetary Union. Whether there is any 
fundamental change of the structure of the international financial system after the new 
global financial crisis is not yet materialized. Nevertheless, after a topsy-turvy global 
financial crisis from the Wall Street in October 2008, according to Jonathan Garner 
and other Morgan Stanley strategies, ‗We believe the world economy is in a painful 
transition to becoming emerging markets-led.‘ For the time being, therefore, our cases 
of Shanghai and Dubai will certainly make a good argument about how and in what 
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ways financial centers can achieve a balance between money, market and state 
involvement in the coming new era of the global financial system. 
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Notes: 
 
                                                 
1
 Various versions of this paper was presented in the East Asia–Gulf Workshop co-
organized by the Centre for the Advanced Studies of the Arab World (CASAW) at 
Durham University and the Gulf Research Center on October 22–23, 2008 in Dubai 
and China in the Arab World and Emerging East Asia-Middle East Nexus Workshop 
organized by CASAW on September 29-30, 2009 at Durham University, United 
Kingdom. Thank you for Professor Anoush Ehteshami and Dr Yukiko Miyagi‘s 
invitation. I would like to thank Christopher Davidson, Christian Koch, Liu 
Hongzhong, Samir Pradhan, Mohamed A. Raouf, Ren Xiao and Eckart Woertz‘s 
comments and advice. Thank you for a special funding from SGIA at Durham 
University to support the trip to Shanghai in May 2009 for further interviews. Thanks 
are due to the Editor of APP and some very useful comments from the two 
anonymous reviewers. 
 
2
 G20 actually is not very precise because the Summit was not only represented by 
state leaders of the largest 20 economies in the world alone. Other leaders, such as the 
Managing Director of International Monetary Fund, the U.N. Secretary, Director 
General of World Trade Organization, Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum, 
World Bank President, the President of the European Union, among the others also 
participated in the Summit. See (The Independent, April 3, 2009, p. 8) 
 
3
 George Soros was born in 1930 in Budapest, Hungary. He graduated at London 
School of Economics in 1952, influenced hugely by Karl Popper. He emigrated to the 
United States in 1956. By 1969, his Quantum Fund was launched. It was a huge 
success. For instance, if you invested U.S.$1,000 in 1969, you could obtain 
U.S.$2,150,000 in 1994, a compound growth of 35 percent. In 1979, He launched 
Open Society Fund (donated $350Mn in 1996). One of his most famous (you may say 
notorious) moves was to speculate on British Sterling in 1992, earning U.S.$1 billion 
in just a few days. After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, he was condemned by then 
Malaysia‘s Prime Minister bin Mahathir in a World Bank meeting in Hong Kong in 
September 1997 as a menace. Starting from 2002, he was investigated by the U.S. 
government. He has been a prolific writer in condemning the government of George 
W. Bush (for example see Soros 2004). 
 
4
 There must be some other financial center index of rankings. But, if you type Global 
financial index to Google, the first one that came out is this report. 
 
5
 Those variables are rules of law, economic strength, local financial establishment, 
financial independence, trustworthiness, social welfare, infrastructure, etc. See (Wang 
2007: 54). 
 
6
 It was a public document. It was also reprinted in the Brochure of the Lu Jia Zui 
Forum 2009 which was organized on May 15-16, 2009 in Shanghai. See (Lu Jia Zui 
Forum 2009: Publication: 2009: 5) 
 
7
 Interviewed May 15, 2009, Shanghai. 
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8
 Interviewed October 23, 2008, Dubai. 
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